Network sharing has become a key feature of various enablers of the next-generation network, such as network function virtualization and fog computing architectures. Network utility maximization (NUM) is a general framework for achieving fair, efficient, and cost-effective sharing of constrained network resources. When agents have asymmetric and private information, however, a fundamental economic challenge is how to solve the NUM problem considering the self-interests of strategic agents. Many previous related works have proposed economic mechanisms that can cope with agents' private utilities. However, the network sharing paradigm introduces the issue of information asymmetries regarding constraints. The related literature largely neglected such an issue; limited closely related studies provided solutions only applicable to specific application scenarios. To tackle these issues, we propose the Decomposable NUM (DeNUM) mechanism and the Dynamic DeNUM (DyDe-NUM) mechanism, the first mechanisms in the literature for solving NUM problems considering private utility and constraint information. The key idea of both mechanisms is to decentralize the decision process to agents, who will make resource allocation decisions without the need of revealing private information to others. Under a monitorable influence assumption, the DeNUM mechanism yields the network-utility maximizing solution at an equilibrium and achieves other desirable economic properties (such as individual rationality and budget balance). We further establish the connection between the equilibrium structure and the primal-dual solution to a related optimization problem, based on which we prove the convergence of the DeNUM algorithm to an equilibrium. When the agents' influences are not monitorable, we propose the DyDeNUM mechanism that yields the network-utility maximizing solution at the cost of the balanced budget. Finally, as a case study, we apply the proposed mechanisms to solving the NUM problem for a fog-based userprovided network and show that both mechanisms improve the network utility by 34% compared to a non-cooperation benchmark.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivations T HE proliferation of mobile devices and applications has been significantly increasing the demand for wireless services. According to Cisco, global mobile traffic has been predicted to increase with an annual growth rate of 60% in the next several years, reaching 48 exabytes per month in 2021 [2] . The unprecedented traffic demand has been pushing mobile network operators to explore more cost-effective and efficient approaches to provide mobile services. Network sharing is a promising paradigm to reduce capital expenditure and the operational expenditure and achieve efficient network sources utilization. It has emerged as an indispensable feature in the 5G system and its enabling architectures including network slicing [3] , network function virtualization [4] , and fog-based networking [5] .
To achieve efficient network sharing, network utility maximization (NUM) is a promising general framework for sharing multiple divisible resources (i.e., those that can be infinitely divided, e.g., bandwidth, power, storages, and network slices) among multiple agents (such as tenants in network slicing architecture and fog nodes in the fog networking architecture) in many network resource allocation problems [6] , [7] . Typically, a NUM Problem aims to optimize allocative/sharing decisions to maximize the aggregate agents' utility, subject to some (coupling) system-level and (uncoupling) local constraints. It had found numerous applications across many different areas besides the network sharing applications. 1 In practice, a system designer (such as a 5G network slice broker [3] in the network slicing architecture) of a networked system does not have complete network information to solve the NUM directly. Even if agents are willing to share their information, gathering such information by a centralized decision maker can incur significant communication overhands and solving such a problem can lead to significant computational overhead, when the size of the NUM Problem is large. Fortunately, many NUM Problems exhibit the decomposability structure (to be explained in details in Section IV-A), which makes it possible to decompose the original centralized NUM Problem into several subproblems [6] . With such a structure, one can design a distributed optimization algorithm through distributively solving subproblems coordinated by proper signaling (often coinciding with the dual variables [6] ). Therefore, such a distributed optimization approach can significantly relieve the system designer's burdens of computation and communications.
The distributed optimization approach assumes that agents are obedient, i.e., willing to follow the algorithm. However, in practice, an agent can be strategic and self-interested (having her own local objective that is different from the system level objective). Thus, an agent may attempt to misreport information or tamper with the algorithms to her advantage, which may result in severe allocation inefficiency. One way for the system designer to address this issue is to design a proper economic mechanism by anticipating such strategic behaviors. For the networked divisible resource allocation problems, related research efforts have mainly focused on the Nash mechanisms which achieve the efficient allocations in a Nash equilibrium (NE) (e.g. [22] - [31] ).
Nevertheless, the network sharing paradigm has introduced several important issues that have been overlooked in the existing mechanisms in the literature. First, although most existing mechanisms (e.g. [22] - [31] ) can cope with strategic agents' private utilities, they assumed that the information regarding the system and local constraints (such as the network topology and capacities) are known by the designer of the mechanism. This is not always true in the network sharing paradigm, since the system designer often does not own the network resources by itself and hence has limited information about the networks. Each self-interested agent may also misreport her private information related to constraints to her advantage. Misreporting constraint information can also incur severe inefficiency loss, as demonstrated in Section III.
Second, existing mechanisms proposed for network resource allocation are often applicable to only specific networking scenarios (e.g. flow control problems [22] - [26] , power and spectrum allocation [27] , and electric vehicles systems [28] ). These mechanisms often do not work for more general and sophisticated NUM Problems or the general network sharing framework.
The above issues motivate the following key question in this paper:
Question: How should one design a unified mechanism framework for the NUM problem, considering strategic agents' private information (of both utilities and constraints)?
B. Solution Approach and Contributions
In this paper, we adopt the idea of optimization decomposition [6] in the mechanism design, building upon which we first propose a Nash Mechanism for the class of Decomposable NUM (DeNUM) Problems, and we call it the DeNUM mechanism. Our approach differs from the traditional mechanism design approach in the following sense. A traditional mechanism directly determines the allocation and money transfer based on agents' submitted messages [34] . In contrast, by exploiting an indirect optimization decomposition structure, our DeNUM mechanism decentralizes the allocative decisions to the side of agents. Specifically, based on agents' submitted messages, the DeNUM Mechanism partitions the system constraints into several individual constraints which are imposed to corresponding agents. Then, the mechanism let agents distributively determine the allocations. Such decentralization eliminates the necessity for agents to reveal their utility and constraint information. Furthermore, such a constraint partitioning works for any decomposable NUM Problem, and thus constitutes a general mechanism framework. The success of a Nash mechanism (such as our proposed DeNUM Mechanism) relies on a distributed algorithm for agents to attain an equilibrium. Imposing individual constraints induces the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) concept, in which agents have interdependent strategy spaces [40] . Designing a distributed algorithm that converges to a GNE is notoriously difficult, since some commonly used NE seeking algorithms fail to converge here [40] . We overcome this challenge by establishing the connection between the GNE and the primal-dual solution to a related optimization problem, which makes it possible to design a family of algorithms that can converge to the GNE.
Our proposed DeNUM Mechanism assumes that the system designer or the other agents can monitor the influences of each agent's action on the system (such as consuming resources or generating interference). However, in some applications, monitoring might be too costly or difficult. This further motivates us to propose a Dynamic DeNUM (DyDeNUM) Mechanism. Different from the DeNUM Mechanism, the DyDeNUM Mechanism exploits a direct optimization decomposition structure that does not further introduce auxiliary constraints. This eliminates the necessity of the monitorable influences. We then show that the DyDeNUM Mechanism can yield the network utility maximization at an equilibrium even when the influence functions are not monitorable. However, such a property comes at a cost of the budget balance.
To summarize, our main contributions are: • General network sharing mechanism framework: Our DeNUM framework, including both the DeNUM Mechanism and the DyDeNUM Mechanism, together with the related distributed algorithms, achieves the network utility maximization for a general class of NUM Problems. • Private constraint information: To the best of our knowledge, we design the first mechanisms in the literature that can cope with agents' information asymmetries regarding system and local constraints in additional to the asymmetric utility information. • Distributed algorithm design: For agents to distributively attach the GNE of the DeNUM Mechanism, we further propose the DeNUM Algorithm. We prove its convergence by relating the GNE to the primal-dual solution to a related optimization problem. Such a proof methodology suggests a general approach to designing distributed algorithms. • Elimination of monitorability requirement: Our DyDeNUM Mechanism can achieve the network utility maximum at an equilibrium even if agents' influences are not monitorable, at the cost of the budget balance. • Fog-based user-provided network: We apply the DeNUM framework to the fog-based application user-provided networks, of which existing mechanisms are inapplicable. We show that both mechanisms can improve the network utility by 34% compared to a benchmark. We organize the rest of this paper as follows. We review the literature in Section II, and motivates our study in Section III with an example of system inefficiency due to agents' misreport. We describe the system model and formulate the decomposable NUM Problems in Section IV. We formally design the DeNUM Mechanism and the DeNUM Algorithm in Sections V and VI, respectively. In Section VII, we formally design the DyDeNUM Mechanism. In Section VIII, we solve a concrete example of user-provided network using the proposed DeNUM framework. Section IX concludes the paper.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. Mechanism Design for Network Function Virtualization
A group of literature related to our work is the mechanism design for network function virtualization (e.g. [4] , [13] - [16] ), which is an important application of the network sharing paradigm. Specifically, in [13] , Fu and Kozat proposed to use the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism [17] - [19] to regulate the virtualized wireless resources. In [14] , Gu et al. proposed an efficient auction for service chains in the network function virtualization market. In [15] , Zhu and Hossain studied an interesting hierarchical auction for virtualization of 5G cellular networks. Du et. al. in [16] proposed an auction traffic offloading based on software-defined network. Readers can refer to the survey [4] for other related work.
There are two main differences between our work and this group of literature. First, most works (e.g. [13] - [16] ) modeled the virtualized resources as indivisible goods and used one-shot VCG-type mechanisms to achieve the network utility maximization. In this paper, we consider the shared resources divisible, which can achieve more flexible network sharing among agents. Moreover, a one-shot VCG-type mechanism is not applicable here. This is because (i) the one-shot VCG-type mechanism requires agents to report their entire utility functions, which incurs significant communication overheads due to the often high dimension information to fully describe the utility function, and (ii) it is impossible for a one-shot dominant-strategy allocation mechanism 2 (such as a VCG-type mechanism) to achieve several properties including the network-utility maximization, budget balance, and individual rationality at the same time [20] . For instance, the VCG-type mechanism cannot achieve the budget balance; Ge and Berry in [21] proposed a dominant-strategy allocation mechanism by quantizing divisible goods but does not achieve the maximal network utility. Finally, the existing literature assumes that the constraint information is globally known.
B. Mechanism Design for the NUM Problems
1) Nash Mechanisms: Due to the above mentioned reasons, research efforts for divisible network resource allocation mainly prefer Nash mechanisms to the dominant-strategy allocation mechanisms (such as the aforementioned one-shot VCG mechanism).
There are many excellent works that proposed Nash mechanisms for specific allocations, such as the general flow control problems (e.g. [22] - [26] ), plug-in electric vehicles system (e.g. [28] ), power allocation and spectrum sharing problem (e.g. [27] ), networked public goods [29] , networked private goods [30] . Sinha et al. studied a relatively more general setting in [31] , which is also a subclass of the problems that we study in this work. Only one work considered the private constraint information [29] , which focused on the uncoupling local constraints for a specific setting instead of the more challenging coupling system constraints.
2) Dynamic Mechanisms: The aforementioned works considered one-shot mechanisms. References [32] , [33] studied interesting dynamic mechanisms that dynamically implement Grove-like taxation [19] , which motivate our DyDe-NUM Mechansim. Different from [32] , [33] , our DyDeNUM Mechanism is able to cope with the asymmetric constraint information and applicable to a more general class of the decomposable NUM Problems.
We summarize the key features of the proposed DeNUM Mechanism and the DyDeNUM Mechanism and the existing mechanisms for the NUM Problems in Table I . 
C. Distributed Algorithms for Nash Mechanisms
Only a few studies focused on the distributed algorithms (dynamics) for the Nash mechanisms for network applications [26] , [30] . We cannot directly apply these algorithms in [26] , [30] in our context. This is because, for GNEs, the best response dynamics considered in [30] was proven to converge only in restrictive cases [40] , while [26] requires to solve a centralized optimization problem in each iteration, which is not available in the problems considered here.
III. AN EXAMPLE OF INEFFICIENCY DUE TO MISREPORTS
To show that misreporting private constraint information can lead to efficiency loss, let us consider the following example.
Example 1: Consider a network flow-control problem with one link provider and one end user (see [24] , [31] ). The link provider can allocate bandwidth x 1 to the user, subject to a capacity constraint c. The user achieves a throughput x 2 , which equals Ax 1 due to packet loss. We refer to A ∈ (0, 1] as the packet delivery ratio. The link has a cost function of C(x 1 ) and the user has a utility function of U (x 2 ). The corresponding NUM Problem is
Suppose that A = 1 and is known by the system designer, while the parameter c is the link provider's private information. The link provider can misreport c, and it may be difficult for the end user or the system designer to verify.
Let c be sufficiently large. Consider the traditional mechanism mentioned (e.g. [24] , [31] ), which determines the throughput and a price per throughput p based on the link provider's reported value ofc. At a "traditional" equilibrium, the price p * equals an optimal dual variable corresponding to the system constraint in (1) [24] , [31] . That is, the equilibrium (x * , p * ) satisfies
Hence, the user's throughput is x * 2 = x * . The link provider has allocation x * 1 = x * and a profit of x * p * − C(x * ). As shown in Fig. 1 , if the provider reports the true value of c, the mechanism's outcome (x * , p * ), as shown in (2) is the coordinates of the intersection point of the two curves U (x) and C (x), i.e., (x o , p * (c)). This leads to a profit of the link provider equal to the area of R plus P , i.e., x * p * −
However, the provider can report a much smaller c, in which case x * =c according to (2) and the price p * will increase. This results in a larger profit of the link provider (which is equal to the area of B plus P ) than the one under truthful report. On the other hand, it reduces the network utility (which equals U (x * 2 ) − C(x * 1 )) by the area of Y plus R. Therefore, a strategic link provider will misreportc to increase its profit, leading to the efficiency loss.
In our technical report [47] , we demonstrate that the link provider can misreport information indicative of the system constraint A to increase her profit, which can also lead to an efficiency loss. Misreporting both types of constraint information leading to an efficiency loss motivates this study.
IV. THE NETWORK UTILITY MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM
In this section, we introduce a network sharing framework of Network Utility Maximization (NUM) with decomposability structures. We describe various components of the model and then present the Decomposable NUM (DeNUM) Problem.
A. System Model
A network sharing NUM framework consists of agents, limited resources characterized by several constraints, and a global objective. 1) Agents: We consider a networked system with a set I = {1, ..., I} of agents. An agent can be either a service provider or a user, as we illustrated in Section III. Each agent is rational and selfish, and hence aims to maximize her own benefit.
Actions:
We use
The value of x i,l captures consumption/sharing of one resource/service or a decision regarding one task. Each agent i's choice of x i is subject to a local constraint characterized by a feasible set X i , i.e., x i ∈ X i . Sharing/consuming no resource (or making no action) is always a feasible choice, i.e., 0 ∈ X i .
Utility Functions: Each agent i has a utility function U i (x i ), which denotes her benefit (or the negative of her cost) as a function of her action x i . 3 Remark 1: With a proper reformulation, our framework is applicable to the case where agent i's utility U i (·) is a function of other agents' actions. Due to space limit, we present the detailed explanations in the online technical report [47] .
2) System Constraints and Influences: Consider a set N = {1, ..., N } of system constraints. Each constraint n couples a set I n ⊆ I of agents' actions. Let h i,n (x i ) denote agent i's influence on the system constraint n. We consider the following additive form for system constraint n:
where the symbol n , associated with constraint n, represents either the equals sign = or the inequality sign ≤; c n denotes a system constraint parameter for constraint n. Let N i {n : i ∈ I n } denote the set of constraints that agent i's action has influence on. Remark 2: With a proper reformulation, our framework is also applicable to the case where the influence function couples all agents' actions, as in Remark 1. Due to space limit, we present the detailed explanations in [47] .
An inequality constraint can capture, for example, resource allocation budget constraints (such as capacity constraints). In this case, a positive (negative) h i,n (x i ) indicates a certain amount of resource consumption (production). 4 An equality constraint usually captures the balancing constraints, such as a network flow balance constraint (e.g. [8] - [10] ) and a market clearing constraint (e.g. [11] ). We assume h i,n (0) = 0, i.e., idleness leads to zero influence on the system. Finally, the additive form in constraint (4) is applicable in a large range of networked applications (e.g. [8] - [12] ).
3) Information Structure: We assume that U i (·), h i,n (·), and X i are agent i's private information that may not be known by others. Though the structure of h i,n (·) is private information, we consider the following monitorability assumption:
Assumption 1 Monitorable Influence: After agent i performs her action x i , the network designer or some other agent in I n can observe the output value of the function h i,n (x i ). For instance, an agent or the network designer can observe the total amount of another agent's resource consumption/production (as illustrated by a concrete example in [47] ) or the interference generated by another agent (as illustrated in Section VIII). Such an assumption is also motivated by the fact that the 5G network slice broker can obtain access to network monitoring measurements such as load and various key performance indicators [3] . We will further discuss how to eliminate the need of Assumption 1 in Section VII.
We assume that the system constraint parameter c n is globally known. However, by a proper reformulation (i.e., introducing auxiliary system and local constraints), our framework is also applicable to the case where some parameter c n is only known by some agent. For detailed discussions, see our online technical report [47] .
B. Network Utility Maximization Formulation:
The system designer is interested in solving the following NUM Problems with a decomposition structure defined as: Definition 1 DeNUM: Decomposable NUM: A DeNUM Problem has the following structures:
We adopt the following standard assumptions to ensure convexity, feasibility, and constraint regularity of the problem:
Assumption 2: The DeNUM Problem satisfies:
We further adopt the following regularity assumption.
Assumption 3 Slater's Condition: There exists a feasible
< c n , for every n representing ≤, = c n , for every n representing =.
Assumptions 2 and 3 ensure the sufficiency and necessity of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions to characterize the global optimal solution of the DeNUM Problem [46] .
C. Desirable Mechanism Properties
It is well known that one can design a distributed algorithm to efficiently solve the DeNUM Problem provided that agents are willing to follow the algorithm [6] , as we will further show in Section V-A. However, such an approach is not self-enforcing since strategic agents may misreport information or tampering with the algorithms. Hence, we need to design economic mechanisms to induce network-utility maximizing equilibria, under which each agent will maximize her local payoff function that is determined by the mechanism. The economic mechanisms should satisfy the following three desirable economic properties and one technical property:
• (E1) Efficiency: The mechanism induces an equilibrium that maximizes the network utility, i.e., achieves the optimal solution of the DeNUM Problem. • (E2) Individual Rationality: Every agent should not be worse off by participating in the mechanism. • (E3) Strong Budget Balance: The total payment from some agents equals the reimbursements to all remaining agents. That is, there is no need to inject or take money.
• (T1) Dynamic Stability: The mechanism admits a distributed iterative algorithm, along which the agents can achieve the equilibrium. We will first design a Nash mechanism to achieve the above properties (E1)-(E3) 6 as well as a corresponding distributed algorithm that achieves (T1). We then design a dynamic mechanism to achieve (E1), (E2), and (T1). It cannot achieve (E3) due to the induced VCG-type taxation.
D. Conditions and Impossibility Results
In this subsection, we discuss the conditions where it is possible for a mechanism to achieve the properties (E1)-(E3). We then adopt the assumptions to rule out the impossible scenarios.
1) Excludability: We adopt the following assumption: Assumption 4 Excludability: The system designer can exclude each agent i from the system, which is equivalent to the case where agent i can only choose an action from the set:
To understand (7) , recall that a positive h i,n (x i ) can represent consumption of a certain amount of resources. Intuitively, the excludability means that the system designer can prevent a non-paying agent from free-riding any network resource.
Fortunately, most resources (or services) in networked systems are excludable. 7 Moreover, almost all existing mechanisms implicitly adopted Assumption 4 (e.g. [22] - [31] ). The reason is that non-excludability is one of the greatest enemies preventing (E1)-(E3) from being possible (see [36] , [39] ). Intuitively, if the agents can always access the resources, they may opt out of any mechanism to avoid possible payments.
2) Impossibility Results: We present conditions regarding parameters {c n } where no mechanism can achieve properties (E1)-(E3) for every DeNUM Problem.
Proposition 1: No mechanism that can achieve both (E2) and (E3) for all DeNUM Problems under one of the following conditions:
• c n is negative for some n such that n is ≤; • c n is non-zero for some n such that n is =.
Due to space limit, we present the proofs of all propositions, lemmata, and theorems in [47] . Intuitively, each agent i can receive at least a utility of U i (0) after opting out of any mechanism. 8 Under the conditions in Proposition 1, the achievable network utility may be so limited that someone must increase her payoff by opting out of any mechanism. Therefore, we adopt the following assumption: 6 As Section II mentioned, we do not seek for another well-known property "truthfulness" (i.e., truthful report is a dominant strategy) since it is not achievable together with (E1)-(E3) and may incur significant overheads. 7 Specifically, bandwidth, cloud services, contents, and electricity are intrinsically excludable. Moreover, many seemingly non-excludable resources have been made excludable. For instance, licensed spectrum is excludable, since Federal Communications Commission (FCC) imposed exclusive rights for a licensed spectrum holder and provides legal protection against unauthorized usage. Exceptions are wireless power in wireless power transfer network [35] and network security investments [36] . 8 This is because h i,n (0) = 0, ∀n ∈ N i and 0 ∈ X i .
Assumption 5 Feasibility of Null: Agents' action profile x = 0 is a feasible solution to the DeNUM Problems, i.e., c n ≥ 0 if n is ≤ and c n = 0 if n is =.
V. THE DENUM MECHANISM
In this section, we propose the DeNUM Mechanism. We first present the indirect decomposition method motivating the DeNUM Mechanism and the key idea behind the DeNUM Mechanism. We then formally present the DeNUM Mechanism and show that it can achieve (E1)-(E3).
A. Indirect Problem Decomposition
We first present the indirect (dual) decomposition [6] that serves as a distributed (pure) optimization method for solving the DeNUM Problem when agents are obedient. We consider to relax the constraints in (4) and then introduce auxiliary variables y i = {y i,n } for each agent i and the corresponding auxiliary constraints. The DeNUM Problem is equivalent to the reformulated one as shown in the following result:
Lemma 1 R-DeNUM: Reformulated Decomposable NUM: The DeNUM Problem defined in Definition 1 is equivalent to the following R-DeNUM Problem:
We can prove this lemma by showing the equivalence of two problems' KKT conditions. The key idea of this reformulation is to partition the system constraints in (4) into several individual constraints and re-impose each of them to the corresponding agent. This constructs an indirect decomposition structure [6] .
To see this, we relax the constraint in (8b) and assign λ = {λ n } n∈N to be the dual variables of it. We can then formulate the corresponding Lagrangian, which can be further decomposed into I locally solvable subproblems. That is, agent i's local problem is:
where we define g i (λ) as the local dual function. At the higher layer, we obtain the optimal dual variable λ o through solving a master (global) dual problem, given by
Substituting λ o into (9), we will have the optimal primary variables (x o i , y o i ) for each agent i's local problem. The above approach works only if agents are obedient. The agent rationality and selfishness motivate us to propose a mechanism to align strategic agents' interests to the above approach to solving the problem in (10).
B. Key Ideas Behind the DeNUM Mechanism
Traditionally, a mechanism consists of a message space and an outcome function [34] , and each agent needs to submit a message. Such a mechanism is a tupleΓ (M, O), where the set M is the space from which agents choose the messages m; the outcome maps their message to the action agents should takex(m) {x i (m)} i∈I and agents' payments Π(m) ). However, to design a mechanismΓ with constraint information asymmetries, we need to find a mapping O(m) that not only solves the DeNUM Problem but also incentivizes agents to reveal their private information, which is challenging.
In this paper, we propose a new mechanism framework, where a mechanism does not directly determine the allocation outcome. Instead, each agent simultaneously submits a message and selects her allocative action x i from an action set determined by the mechanisms. 9 Specifically, the considered mechanism is a tuple Γ (M, T (m), Π(m)): the set M is the message space. The set T (m)
{T i (m) ⊆ X i } i∈I characterizes each agent's action space x i . A key feature (and challenge of the analysis later on) is that T (m) depends not only on X i but also on some (unspecified) constraint determined by messages m announced by agents (which results in coupling among agents). Function Π(m) describes agents' payments (also called taxes in the proposed framework).
The advantages of such a mechanism framework are twofold. First, the computation of the allocation outcome is distributed and performed locally by agents. Second, by carefully designing a mechanism, only the agents need to utilize the private (utility and constraint) information for solving their own local problems. This eliminates the necessity for revealing agents' constraint information through a mechanism.
C. DeNUM Mechanism and Its Induced Game 1) Formal Mechanism Design:
We introduce the DeNUM Mechanism which describes the message space M, budgets constraining agents' actions T (m), and their taxes Π(m).
Mechanism 1 DeNUM: The DeNUM Mechanism Consists of the Following Components:
to the system designer: 10
where p i,n and τ i,n denote agent i's price proposal and budget proposal, respectively. We denote all agents' message profile as m = {m i } i∈I . • Imposed Constraints: For the action x i of agent i ∈ I, the system designer imposes an additional budget constraint on the agent's influence h i,n (x i ), denoted by
where τ n = {τ i,n } i∈In and t i,n is agent i's budget associated with system constraint n, denoted by
• Taxation Π: For each system constraint n ∈ N i , each agent i pays a tax of 11
where m n = {m i,n } i∈In . Here ω(n, i + 1) denotes the circular neighbor of agent i on constraint n. More specifically, suppose i is the υ-th smallest index in I n , then 12 ω(n, i + 1)
In our DeNUM Mechanism, each agent should simultaneously submit two types of messages (price and budget) and decide her action x i . For each system constraint n, proposal τ i,n denotes the budget t i,n that agent i demands; p i,n denotes the price that agent i is willing to pay. Both X i and the constraints specified by (12)-(13) constrain agent i's possible strategy. Finally, each agent pays a tax (14)-(15) associated with other agents' price proposals and her own budgets.
Note that constraints in (12)-(13) can be either "hard" physical constraints or "soft" contractual constraints. In the latter case, each agent is still able to violate the constraints, but such violation is detectable by comparing the output of the function h i,n (x i ) (by Assumption 1) and t i,n (τ n ), without requiring the knowledge of the exact forms of h i,n (x i ). Note that agents are willing to monitor each other on behalf of the system designer and report any violator. This is because one agent's violating action will harm the benefit of another, since the latter may not access the whole budget as promised in (12) . Therefore, as far as the mechanism is concerned, we assume that the constraints in (12)-(13) are "hard" and inviolable.
The taxation for each agent i in (14) consists of a payment term for her budget and a penalty term. The payment term regulates agents' demands of the budget in such a way that each agent's payoff has a similar structure to the objective in (9) . The penalty term is motivated by [37] , which penalizes price proposal deviations to incentivize similar price proposals and is designed to become zero at the induced equilibrium.
2) DeNUM Game: The above DeNUM Mechanism induces a DeNUM Game where each agent simultaneously decides m i = {m i,n } n∈N and x i , aiming to maximize her utility minus her tax in (15) 
and considering other agents' decisions: DeNUM Game (Induced by the DeNUM Mechanism):
• Players: all agents in I; • Strategy Space: for agent i ∈ I, her strategy space is
• (Quasi-linear) payoff function J i (·): each agent i has a payoff function
Different from the traditional mechanisms [34] , the DeNUM Mechanism induces a game where each agent's strategy includes m i and x i chosen from coupled strategy spaces.
3) Generalized Nash Equilibrium: The game-theoretic solution concept for the DeNUM Game is the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) [40] . 14 This concept generalizes the traditional NE since agent strategies impact not only other agents' payoffs but also other agents' strategy space.
Definition 2 Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE): A GNE of the DeNUM Game is a strategy profile (x * , m * ) such that for every agent i ∈ I and every strategy
where m * −i {m * j } j =i is the GNE strategy profile of all other agents except agent i.
D. GNE Analysis 1) GNE Price Proposals:
For each agent i, her price proposal only affects the penalty term in (14) . We can verify that each agent i will always choose p i,n = p ω(n,i+1),n for every system constraint n ∈ N i to minimize the penalty. This leads to the following result.
Lemma 2 Common Price Proposals: The GNE price proposals satisfy that, for each system constraint n, 13 The strategy space in (16) for each agent is always non-empty. This is because h i,n (0) = 0 and each agent i can always submit an appropriate τ i,n to ensure t i,n (τ i ; τ −i ) = 0. Therefore, agents can always ensure the feasibility of (16), regardless of other agents' message m −i . 14 The standard GNE (or an NE) usually stands for a solution concept for a game with complete information, which is not the case here. Instead, we adopt the common interpretation in the literature of Nash mechanisms (see [25] , [26] , [30] , [31] ). That is, a GNE is a "stationary" point of some strategy updating processes (to be described in Section VI-A) that possesses the equilibrium property in (18). By Lemma 2, since every agent submits her price proposals according to (19) , every penalty term in (14) is zero. In addition, the budgets determined in (13) ensure that i∈In t i,n (τ n ) = c n for every τ n . It follows that Proposition 2 Budget Balance: The DeNUM Mechanism satisfies the budget balance (E3), i.e., i∈I Π i (m * ) = 0.
2) Agent Payoff Maximization: By Lemma 2 and (18), agents achieve a GNE if, under the properly selected common price proposals {p * n } n∈N , each agent i solves the following convex Agent Payoff Maximization (APM) Problem:
In other words, the KKT conditions of the APM Problem determine both {p * n } n∈N and {(x * i , τ * i )} i∈I . The APM Problem has a similar structure to the local problem in (9) . However, different from (9), each agent self-enforcingly solves the APM Problem because it leads to her maximal payoff at a GNE. In other words, the mechanism aligns each agent's interest with the decomposed optimization problem in (9) . Moreover, only agent i solving her APM Problem requires the knowledge of U i (·), h i,n (·), and X i . This resolves our main issue of information asymmetries and leads to the following results.
Theorem 1 Existence, Efficiency, and Full Implementation: There exists at least one GNE in the DeNUM Game. When Assumptions 1-3 hold, every GNE leads to the optimal solution to the DeNUM Problem (E1). Proof Sketch: For any optimal solution (x o , λ o ) of the R-DeNUM Problem, a strategy profile (x * , m * ) that satisfies the following property is always a GNE:
This proves the existence of the GNE. Due to the similarity of the structure between the APM Problem and the problem in (9), we can show the equivalence between the KKT conditions of the DeNUM Problem and those of all agents' APM Problems combined. Every GNE is thus a network-utility maximum.
Theorem 2 Individual Rationality: When Assumptions 1-5 hold, the DeNUM Mechanism is individually rational (E2). Proof Sketch: By Assumption 3, if agent i chooses not to participate in the mechanism, her maximal payoff is max xi∈X Out i U i (x i ). If agent i chooses to participate, she can always submit a messagem i = (τ i , p * i )
, which leads to t i,n = 0. Therefore, her maximal payoff at a GNE is at least max xi∈X Out i U i (x i ) + n∈Ni p * n c n /|I n |. We then show that the term n∈Ni p * n c n /|I n | is always non-negative at a GNE. This completes the proof.
In a nutshell, the DeNUM Mechanism achieves (E1)-(E3) when Assumptions 1-5 hold.
VI. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM TO ACHIEVE THE GNE
In the DeNUM Game, each agent does not directly know her GNE strategy satisfying (18) due to private information regarding utilities and constraints. Hence, we propose the Each agent i sends p i,n [k] to agent ω(i + 1, n) for every n ∈ N i and conv_count to agent i + 1; 14 end 15 if conv_count = I then 16 Set conv_flag ← 1 and broadcasts it; 17 end 18 end 19 Each agent i submits message m i to the system designer; 20 The system designer computes (t i (m), Π i (m)) according to (13)- (15) and sends them to every agent i;
DeNUM algorithm for agents to distributively update their strategy and attain a GNE. 15 We then prove its convergence.
A. The Iterative DeNUM Algorithm
Algorithm 1 shows the proposed iterative DeNUM Algorithm for agents to distributively compute their GNE, with the key steps explained in the following. Each agent i ∈ I first initializes her message m i [0] ∈ R 2×|Ni| (line 2). The algorithm iteratively computes each agent's message and action until convergence (lines 4-18). For each iteration, agents update their messages and actions in a Gauss-Seidel fashion (lines [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . That is, we divide one iteration into I sub-iterations (line 6). In each sub-iteration i, only agent i updates her messages and actions, whereas the other agents keep theirs fixed.
In particular, in each sub-iteration i, each agent i updates 15 Due to the possibility of multiple primal solutions to the DeNUM Problem and multiple dual solutions to the dual problem in (10), different GNEs may lead to different individual payoffs and hence different agents might have different preferences in terms of different equilibria. Note that if different agents choose to play their corresponding equilibrium strategies corresponding to different equilibria, then the overall strategy profile of all players may not be an equilibrium. Therefore, reaching one GNE relies on agents' consensus by following the DeNUM Algorithm.
wherep ω(i−1,n),n [k] satisfies
and α[k] is a diminishing step size, given by α[k] = (1 + β)/ (k + β) for some non-negative constant β. The explanation is as follows. First, each agent i maximizes her payoff function in (21a), expecting that there is no penalty term in (14) and her budgets equals to her budget proposals (i.e., t i = τ i ). The algorithm will satisfy these two expectations when it converges as we will show. Second, each agent i sets the additional upper bound t up i,n in (21a) by
which ensures that the submitted {τ i [k]} are bounded. Such an upper bound always exists due to the compactness of the set X i . Third, in (21b), each agent updates her price proposals to resemble others' most recent updated price proposals to reduce the penalty in (14) . Finally, each agent checks the termination criterion (line 16). The termination happens if the relative changes of all agents' price proposals in any continuous I sub-iterations are small enough. When the algorithm converges, agents submit their messages to the system designer to compute their imposed constraints and taxes (lines [19] [20] .
Regarding the complexity of the algorithm, the system designer has very few computation and communication over- 
B. Convergence Analysis
To prove the convergence of Algorithm 1, we first establish the connection between a GNE and the optimal primal-dual solution of the R-DeNUM Problem in the following: Theorem 3 Equivalence: When Assumptions 1-3 hold, for a given optimal primal-dual solution (x o , y o , λ o ) to the R-DeNUM Problem in (8) , the following strategy profile (x * , τ * , p * ) is a GNE: for all (i, n) ∈ {(i, n) : i ∈ I n },
where p * n is the common price proposal in Lemma 2. The proof of Theorem 3 involves exploiting its KKT conditions of the R-DeNUM Problem in (8) and those of the APM Problems in (20) .
The significance of Theorem 3 is two-fold. First, it provides a new interpretation of the messages of the DeNUM Mechanism. Specifically, the budget proposals τ i play a role of the auxiliary variables y i while each comment price proposal p * n plays a role of a dual variable λ n . Second, Theorem 3
suggests that any distributed algorithm updating (x, m) to a primal-dual solution also converges to a GNE of the DeNUM Game. 16 We prove the convergence next: Proposition 3: When Assumptions 1-3 hold, the DeNUM Algorithm converges to a GNE. The proof of the proposition involves showing that the DeNUM Algorithm 1 is an incremental subgradient based algorithm [41] which updates a dual variable incrementally in (21b). Such an algorithm is convergent when α[k] is a diminishing step size and τ i [k] is bounded [41] .
VII. THE DYNAMIC DENUM MECHANISM
The success of the DeNUM Mechanism relies on Assumption 1, i.e., the output values of each agent's influence functions h i,n (x i ) are monitorable. In this section, we propose the DyDeNUM Mechanism, a dynamic mechanism that can achieve (E1)-(E2) and (T1) even if the influence functions are not monitorable (hence without Assumption 1). The tradeoff is that the DyDeNUM Mechanism is not guaranteed to satisfy the budget balance (E3).
A. The DyDeNUM Mechanism
We formally introduce the DyDeNUM Mechanism in Mechanism 2. Different from the DeNUM Mechanism, the DyDe-NUM Mechanism is executed in a dynamic fashion with the key steps introduced in the following. 
Each iteration of the DyDeNUM Mechanism consists of I sub-iterations (similar to the DeNUM Algorithm).
In each sub-iteration i, each agent i should sequentially (in a Gauss-Seidel manner) submit three types of messages including price proposals, demand, and marginal utility. At the end of each iteration, the system designer updates each agent's tax in (25) based on other agents' reported price proposals and demands.
Given the tax in (25) and all other agents' messages m −i , each agent i aims at maximizing her long-term average payoff:
We will show that each agent is interested in updating and reporting the message {m i [k]} k∈N in the following way: for each iteration k ∈ N,
wherep ω(i−1,n),n [k] is defined in (22) , and α[k] is the diminishing step size, given by α[k] = (1 + β)/(k + β) for some non-negative constant β.
We will soon show that the DyDeNUM Mechanism and the updates in (27)- (29) converge to an optimal solution to the DeNUM Problem and every agent following such updates and reports is a Nash equilibrium.
B. Convergence and Network Utility Maximization
In this subsection, we study the properties of the DyDeNUM Mechanism. (29) together with the DyDeNUM Mechanism essentially constitute an incremental subgradient method [41] , similar to the DeNUM Algorithm.
Different from the DeNUM Algorithm that distributively solves the dual problem with the indirect decomposition, the DyDeNUM Mechanism with (27)-(29) exploits a direct decomposition structure [6] . 17 In other words, the DyDeNUM Mechanism does not require auxiliary constraints associated with each agent's influence functions {h i,n (x i )} n∈Ni as in the DeNUM Mechanism and the R-DeNUM Problem in (8) . This eliminates the necessity of Assumption 1, which is essential for imposing auxiliary constraints. We are ready to present the following result.
Theorem 4 Nash Equilibrium: When Assumptions 2-3 hold, every agent chooses to update and report according to (27) - (29) is a Nash equilibrium. Theorem 4 implies that the updating and reporting according to (27) - (29) is each agent i's optimal strategy, when all other agents select to do so. Intuitively, supposing that all agents are reporting and updating by (27)-(29), each agent i's tax is
where the approximation in the second line of (30) is controlled by the step size α[k] in (27 (29) , the DyDeNUM Mechanism achieves the maximal network utility. Therefore, when all agents other than i update and report according to (27)-(29), it is always agent i's optimal strategy to do so.
C. Computation of the Initial Tax and Individual Rationality
In this subsection, we discuss that it is possible to further design {Π i [0]} i∈I in a way to achieve the individual rationality (E2). Specifically, we can consider a distributed algorithm similar to the updates in (27)- (29) . Such an algorithm computes the maximal network utility of the system excluding agent i. 18 The resulted initial tax Π i [0] together with (30) makes each agent i receive a VCG-type tax, and can thus achieve the individual rationality as follows.
Proposition 5: When Assumptions 2-5 hold, the DyDeNUM Mechanism satisfies the individual rationality (E2). However, our DyDeNUM Mechanism cannot guarantee the budget balance, which is one of the disadvantages of the VCG-type taxation. In a nutshell, the DyDeNUM Mechanism exploits the direct composition structure to avoid the necessity of Assumption 1, however, at the cost of the budget balance. 18 Due to space limit, we present the details of such an algorithm in [47] . 
VIII. APPLICATION: FOG-BASED USER-PROVIDED NETWORK
In this section, we consider the fog-based user-provided network (UPN) as a concrete example of the DeNUM framework, to demonstrate the effectiveness of the DeNUM Mechanism, the DeNUM Algorithm, and the DyDeNUM Mechanism. Such an application is motivated by the Open Garden framework [10] , [44] . As shown in Fig. 2 , in a UPN, near-by agents (who are mobile users) can form a mesh network through Bluetooth or Wi-Fi Direct, and share their Internet access capabilities among each other.
UPNs can exploit diverse network resources and thus improve the overall network performance. However, the success of such services relies on an appropriate economic mechanism that can provide incentives for providing services and cope with information asymmetries. 19 
A. System Model
Wireless mesh network [10] . Consider a mesh network that is described by a directed graph G = (I, E), where I denotes the set of users and E denotes the set of communication links. We define B (i←j) as the set of all direct links that will interfere with link (i ← j). Let C ij be the capacity of link (i ← j).
User decisions. Let x i←j (n) denote the amount of data user j's to her one-hop downstream neighbor i, where (n) represents that such a unicast session originates from the Internet (e.g., a web/content server) and will end at user n ∈ I. Let x In i = {x i←j (n)} j∈I In (i),n∈I be user i's upstream data vector and let x Out i = {x j←i (n)} j∈I Out (i),n∈I denote user i's downstream data vector, where I In (i) and I Out (i) are sets of user i's upstream and downstream one-hop neighbors, respectively. Let y i (n) be the amount of data user's i downloaded from the Internet for user n. Based on the protocol interference model [10] , we assume that a transmission over link (i ← j) ∈ E is successful only if all other links (k ← m) x k←m (n) C km ≤ 1,
This means that in each time period (the length of which is normalized to 1), the total amount of transmission time of link (i ← j) and all links in B (i←j) cannot exceed 1.
In our DeNUM framework, constraint (31) belongs to a system constraint.
User utility and cost. Each user i has an increasing and strictly concave utility U i (r i ), where r i is the user i's received data, given by r i (x In i , y i (i)) = j∈I In (i) x i←j (i) + y i (i). Each user has an increasing strictly convex cost function C i (y i , x Out i ), which captures the energy consumption and payments of the mobile data services. We define each user i's payoff as,
which is strictly concave. Due to space limit, we present the entire problem formulation in [47] .
B. Simulation Results
In this subsection, we consider a setting with 5 agents where agent 2 does not have an Internet connection. Agents' energy consumption models are based on empirical data. We present the detailed simulation setup in [47] . In Fig. 3(a) , we plot agents' network utility achieved by the DeNUM Algorithm and the DyDeNUM Mechanism in each iteration. We see that the DeNUM Mechanism converges to the offline optimum within 20 iterations and the DyDeNUM Mechanism converges within 60 iterations. The DyDeNUM Mechanism converges more slowly since it requires a small step size in (27) to achieve a reasonable approximation in (30) . In addition, before the convergence, the network utility is even larger than the respective optimal value, which is because the produced aggregate payoff is not feasible until convergence.
Second, in Fig. 3(b) , we consider a benchmark scheme in which each agent can only access her own cellular downlink (which is equivalent to not participating in any mechanism and bear a constraint in (7)). We study the performances of the DeNUM Mechanism and the DyDeNUM Mechanism, compared with the benchmark. 20 We observe that, for each agent i, both mechanisms always improve upon the benchmark payoff, which implies that both mechanisms achieve the individual rationality (E2). In addition, the DeNUM Mechanism improves the average payoff by 34%. Although both the DyDeNUM Mechanism and the DeNUM Mechanism achieve the same maximal network utility, the DyDeNUM Mechanism achieves a higher payoff for each agent. This is because the system designer needs to compensate each agent to participate in the DyDeNUM Mechanism and therefore incurs a budget deficiency, as also shown in Fig. 3(b) .
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a new economic mechanism framework for solving the decomposable NUM Problems in network sharing. Our proposed DeNUM Mechanism can cope with agents' strategic behaviors and private utility and constraint information, with the desirable economic properties including efficiency, individual rationality, and budget balance. In addition, we proposed a distributed low-complexity DeNUM Algorithm provably convergent to the equilibrium of the DeNUM Game. We further designed a DyDeNUM Mechanism that achieves the network utility maxima even if the monitorable influence assumption is not satisfied but at the cost of the balanced budget. There are several directions for extensions. Since our mechanisms are susceptible to collusive agents, one may ask how to design group-strategyproof mechanisms for the NUM framework.
